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Abstract—Wireless communications are vulnerable to certain 
number of cyber-attacks and intrusion attempts due to the 
intrinsic openness of the communication channel. Virtual 
jamming attack stands out among other attacks. This type of 
attack is easy to implement, energy-efficient to be launched, and 
represents one of the most important threats to the security of 
wireless networks. As the complexity of the attacks keeps 
increasing, new and more robust detection mechanisms need to be 
developed. A number of Network Intrusion Detection Systems 
(NIDSs) have been presented in the literature to detect this type of 
attack. To tackle the problem of virtual jamming attacks on IEEE 
802.11 networks, we present a novel Hybrid-NIDS (H-NIDS) 
based on Dempster-Shafer (DS) Theory of Evidence. The proposed 
method aims at combining the advantages of signature-based and 
anomaly-based NIDSs. The performance of the proposed solution 
has been experimentally evaluated with multiple scenarios in an 
IEEE 802.11 network.  
 
Index Terms—Data Fusion, Intrusion Detection Systems, 
Measurements and Networking, Network Security, Virtual 
Jamming Attacks, Wireless Network Measurements 
I. INTRODUCTION 
HE intrinsic physical openness of wireless communication 
channels exposes wireless and cellular networks to a 
certain number of attacks, such as jamming that can be very 
difficult to trace [1, 2]. Today, jamming attacks are rather easy 
to implement, considering a number of off-the-shelf tools is 
available [3-5], and thus represent one of the most serious 
threats to the availability of wireless networks. Jamming attacks 
can be classified as physical jamming and virtual jamming. 
Examples of the former are: radio jamming, where the attacker 
continuously transmits a radio signal carrying random bits, and 
collision attack, where the attacker sends a packet only when it 
senses that a legitimate user is sending a valid packet, so as to 
cause a collision [6]. Examples of virtual jamming are: spurious 
Request-To-Sent/Clear-To-Sent (RTS/CTS) attacks, which 
consist in sending fake RTS frames, and Network Allocator 
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Vector (NAV) attacks, where the attacker alters the duration 
field of legitimate packets. Both types of attack aim to delay the 
transmission of legal frames. Compared to physical jamming, 
virtual jamming is easier to implement and needs little power to 
be carried out. 
A number of Network Intrusion Detection Systems (NIDSs) 
have been presented in the literature to detect a wide range of 
jamming threats [7-12]. A NIDS can be classified as a 
signature-based NIDS (also known as misuse-based NIDS) or 
an anomaly-based NIDS. The former detects attacks by 
comparing the network traffic profile with signatures of well- 
known threats or attacks. This type of NIDS is generally very 
efficient and accurate, but fails to identify attacks that do not 
belong to the set of reference signature. This includes attacks 
that are launched for the first time or attacks that slightly differ 
from their former and known implementations. On the other 
hand, an anomaly-based NIDS compares the network traffic 
profile against a baseline representing the normal (attack-free) 
behaviour of the network. Generally, this type of NIDS is not 
as accurate as signature-based NIDSs, since its performance is 
poorer in terms of False Positive Ratio (FPR) [13]. However, 
unlike signature-based NIDSs, anomaly-based NIDSs can 
successfully detect novel and unseen attacks and threats. More 
recently, Hybrid-NIDSs (H-NIDSs) have been developed to 
combine the detection capabilities and the aforementioned 
advantages of both types of NIDSs: the high Detection Rate 
(DR) of signature-based NIDSs with the ability to detect novel 
attacks of anomaly-based NIDSs [14-16]. 
The authors have recently presented an anomaly-based NIDS 
to detect virtual jamming NAV attacks on IEEE 802.11 
networks [17]. The core detector adopts an anomaly-based 
approach, which exploits an implementation of the Dempster- 
Shafer (DS) Theory of Evidence [18]. The performance of the 
detection algorithm is overall encouraging, but it suffers from 
high FPR and False Negative Ratio (FNR) when certain 
combinations of metrics are used. 
In this paper, we present a novel H-NIDS to detect virtual 
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jamming attacks on IEEE 802.11 networks. This H-NIDS 
extends and improves the method that we previously proposed 
in [17], with a completely rearranged architecture. With this 
proposed hybrid approach, we want to improve the detection 
accuracy of the system, and reduce the number of false alarms. 
Our contribution in this paper can be summarised as follows: 
First, we propose a novel framework for an H-NIDS to 
combine the detection capabilities and the advantages of two 
types of NIDSs. In particular, the core detector architecture of 
the proposed solution runs in parallel an anomaly-based and a 
signature-based detection engine. Then, the detector applies the 
Dempster’s rule of combination on the two independent pieces 
of information. 
Second, the performance of the novel hybrid solution is 
evaluated against virtual jamming attacks in an IEEE 802.11 
network environment. A new network traffic dataset has been 
collected for evaluation purposes, which takes into account new 
relevant scenarios not previously studied in [10]. Additionally, 
in this work we consider a wider set of metrics not previously 
used in [10], which could manifest the presence of an attack. 
The selection of the metrics has been done experimentally, 
during a pre-processing stage. 
Finally, the whole solution is implemented as a single 
monitoring station, which derives the metrics by observing the 
current traffic within the IEEE 802.11 testbed network. Unlike 
other solutions proposed in the literature, the H-NIDS that we 
propose is implemented as a light, centralised and on-line 
solution. The architecture of the proposed detector allows the 
implementation of the detection process, with a reduced set of 
metrics, which induces a limited computational processing 
increase. 
The paper is organised as follows. Section II presents an 
analysis of the state of the art related to jamming attack 
detection in Wi-Fi networks. The virtual jamming NAV attack 
and the proposed detection methodology, as well as the 
architecture of the H-NIDS are all described in Section III. The 
performance assessment is included in Section IV, which 
describes the implementation of the attack and the testbed. The 
analysis of the experimental results is presented in Section V. 
Finally, conclusions are given in Section VI. 
II. RELATED WORK 
Jamming attacks have been widely investigated in the 
literature. Multiple authors have proposed several solutions to 
tackle the problem for a wide range of jamming attacks [7-12]. 
In [7], the authors present DOMINO, a piece of software 
installed in or near an Access Point (AP) in order to detect MAC 
layer greedy behaviour in 802.11 hotspots. DOMINO is 
organised in three modules: (i) Deviation Estimation 
Component (DEC), (ii) Anomaly Detection Component (ADC) 
and (iii) Decision Making Component (DMC). The DEC 
module performs the following tests: retransmission 
consistency, DIFS consistency, NAV consistency and back-off 
manipulation test. DOMINO runs the tests for each node by 
tracking the transmission of each node in the network. 
Therefore, the required processing time and the computational 
cost of the analysis may become very demanding as the number 
of nodes in the network increases [8]. The performance of 
DOMINO was assessed using the network simulator NS-3 [19]. 
The results show that DOMINO is characterised by high 
detection accuracy and resiliency to several factors, such as 
traffic type variations. 
The authors of [9] present a different solution, based on a 
distributed cross-layer detection system for a wide range of 
jamming attacks. The monitoring functionality is randomly 
distributed among the nodes, and the detection mechanism is 
organised in two phases. In the first phase, the system performs 
four tests on: (i) the physical idle time, (ii) the average number 
of RTS/CTS frames transmitted by a node, (iii) the virtual idle 
time (NAV), and (iv) the average number of retransmissions of 
a node. In the second phase, the results are combined and then 
a final test is carried out in order to increase accuracy. It is worth 
noting that this solution becomes time and resource consuming 
when the number of nodes in the network increases, since tests 
need to be carried out for each node. The performance is 
assessed through the simulator GloMoSim [20]. The results 
show that as the number of nodes increases, the data rate 
detection decreases, and the number of false positive increases. 
In [17], an off-line detection algorithm is proposed, which is 
able to detect and classify physical and virtual jamming attacks. 
The algorithm needs the following metrics as inputs: Packet 
Delivery Ratio (PDR) and Packets Send Ratio (PSR). The 
algorithm outcomes are compared with a Signal Strength 
Consistency check in order to improve the overall system 
accuracy. The consistency test is necessary because, as the 
authors suggest, a low PDR might be caused by a node running 
out of battery or a user moving away from the coverage area. 
The used metrics have to be calculated for each node, and data 
have to be retrieved from transmitting and receiving nodes 
during the jamming attack. The simulation results show that the 
algorithm is characterised by high accuracy and precision rates. 
A threshold-based NIDS to detect virtual jamming attacks on 
IEEE 802.11 networks was presented by the authors in [10], 
who take the decision on packets sent and delivery ratio. 
Similarly, against jamming attack, the authors in [11] propose 
a distributed solution to detect jamming attacks using only 
metrics from the physical layer. In detail, the method is based 
on the detection of changes in the statistical characteristics of 
the Signal-to-Noise Ratio (SNR). The detection is carried out 
locally by using either a simple-threshold algorithm or a 
CUSUM-based algorithm. An improved version of the method, 
based on DS theory that combines distributed sensor beliefs is 
also compared against local based algorithms. Prior work in DS 
theory also includes multi-metric, cross-layer anomaly-based 
techniques that have been evaluated for detection of Man-in-
the-Middle (MitM) and de-authentication attacks [21].  
More recently, H-NIDSs have been developed to combine 
the detection capabilities and the advantages of both types of 
NIDSs. An H-NIDS is proposed in [22] to detect attacks in a 
cloud computing environment. This H-NIDS implements a 
Bayesian classifier for the anomaly part and a SNORT [23] 
script for the misuse part of the core detector. The authors show 
that the solution is characterised by high DR and low FPR. 
 
Another H-NIDS is proposed in [24] to detect Distributed 
Denial of Service attacks (DDoS) at the application layer, 
which implements a Bayesian classifier for the anomaly part 
and a Hidden Markov Model (HMM) for the misuse part of the 
detector. Similarly to [22], the detectors show high DR along 
with high FPR. Equally good results in terms of both DR and 
FPR are experienced in [25], where an H-NIDS based on 
Principal Component Analysis (PCA) and Self Organising Map 
(SOM) is presented. 
In this paper, we propose a novel H-NIDS designed to detect 
virtual jamming attacks. Such type of attacks leverage the 
ability of an attacker to manipulate the NAV value, which is a 
prominent virtual carrier sensing mechanism in CSMA/CD. It 
is therefore a common characteristic of all 802.11 MAC based 
wireless networks and even used in other technologies, such as, 
WiMax [34, 35]. Furthermore, it is worth noting that, 4G/5G 
networks heavily rely on IEEE 802.11 as a Radio Access 
Technology (RAT) [26] for reducing the traffic overload and 
coping with a high and dynamic user density while sharing a 
finite radio spectrum. Therefore, addressing this particular 
attack in our scenario, is also applicable and beneficial towards 
mobile communications. 
The core detector of the presented solution exploits the 
Dempster’s rule of combination of DS to merge pieces of 
evidence of a possible attack. The information is inferred by 
using an anomaly-based and signature-based detection 
approach. Unlike the solutions listed previously, the H-NIDS 
that we propose is implemented as a light, centralised and on-
line solution. The whole solution is implemented as a single 
monitoring station, which derives the metrics by observing the 
current traffic within the IEEE 802.11 testbed network.  
III. PROPOSED DETECTION METHODOLOGY 
A. Data Fusion Approach Based on DS Theory 
The proposed H-NIDS is based on the use of evidence theory. 
In recent years, the theory of belief functions, also known as the 
theory of evidence developed by Dempster and Shafer [18], has 
drawn the attention of many researchers, especially in the fields 
of sensor and data fusion [27]. The DS theory provides a simple 
but robust framework to merge information coming from 
different sensors, taking into account the available pieces of 
evidence. In contrast to Bayesian theory, the DS theory does not 
require a priori knowledge and enables a way of measuring 
ignorance, when the evaluated data cannot be allocated within 
the considered hypotheses. It has proven to be a viable solution 
in cases where it is impossible to apply classical sensor fusion 
techniques, such as Kalman filter or Bayesian networks, or 
when it is virtually impossible to find a pattern in the system 
behaviour to build an appropriate model [11]. In addition, the 
DS theory has also been used to develop a new mathematical 
framework [27-29] alternative to the Guide to the Expression of 
Uncertainty in Measurement (GUM) [30] for the evaluation of 
the uncertainty in complex measurement systems. 
The DS theory considers a set of events Θ = {θ1, θ2, …, θn}, 
which is a finite set of all possible mutually exclusive 
propositions about some problem domain, known as frame of 
discernment. Regarding this work, the aim is to identify 
whether the analysed network traffic is malicious or non-
malicious. Therefore, Θ is composed of two elements A = 
Attack and N = Normal. Assuming Θ has two outcomes {A, N}, 
the total number of hypotheses is defined by 2Θ = {A, N, {A|N}, 
Ø}. In the case of {A|N}, this subset corresponds to Uncertainty 
(either A or N). In addition, the empty set Ø is always null. Each 
hypothesis is assigned a belief value within the range [0, 1], also 
known as a Basic Probability Assignment (BPA), which 
expresses the evidence attributed directly to the hypothesis. The 
BPA is a function m(H), which describes the measure of belief 
committed directly to the hypothesis H by an observer. It is 
worth noting that, in contrast to probability theory, the DS 
theory does not comply with the additivity rule [31]. 
After defining the BPA value for each hypothesis, the DS 
theory combines evidence of information from different 
observers or sensors with similar Θ using the Dempster’s rule 
of combination [18]. This rule is defined in (1), and calculates 
the orthogonal summation of the BPAs values in one hypothesis 
from two different observers into a single belief. Let m1(H) and 
m2(H) be the BPA in the hypothesis H, from observer 1 and 2, 
respectively. Similarly, X ∩ Y = H refers to all combinations of 
evidence which yield H; whereas X ∩ Y = Ø refers to the 
mutually exclusive subsets of the hypothesis H, thus their 
intersection is the empty set. 
!"#$% & = 	
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	∀	& ≠ Ø			(1) 
Dempster’s rule allows the combination of evidence from 
two observers at a time. In order to combine evidence from 
more observers, Dempster’s rule can be used repeatedly several 
times in consecutive iterations. The output of the initial 
combination process is used as input evidence in the next 
iteration, along with the evidence of information from a third 
observer. Dempster’s rule satisfices the associative property, 
thus the order in which the belief values are fused does not 
affect the final combined belief values. A more comprehensive 
presentation of DS theory is presented in [18]. 
An important issue affecting the development phase of a 
detector based on the use of evidence theory is how to define 
the BPA values. In the literature, there exist several ways of 
assigning probabilities to each of the hypotheses, ranging from 
data mining techniques to empirical approaches. One method to 
find an automatic and self-adaptive process of BPA without a 
previous training process or fine tuning period was initially 
presented in [21], using three independent statistical 
mechanisms. 
B. Architecture of the Proposed Hybrid NIDS 
The architecture of the proposed H-NIDS is shown in Fig. 1. 
It consists of three main blocks, the BPA function calculation 
block, enclosed in the dashed-borders box in Fig. 1, the data 
fusion block and the decision-making block. The BPA function 
calculation block reads the fields in the network frames, 
extracts the relevant monitored metrics and calculates the BPA 
values for each monitored metric and for each of the three 
considered hypotheses (i.e. Attack, Normal and Uncertainty). 
 
The relevant metrics extracted for our experiments are 
described in Section IV.C. The data fusion block merges the 
computed BPA values for each metric and calculates the overall 
BPA values. Lastly, the decision-making block makes a final 
decision on whether a NAV attack is taking place or not, based 
on the final BPA values of the three considered hypotheses. 
Each of the three blocks is explained in more detail in the 
following subsections. 
1) BPA Function Calculation Block 
Regarding the first block, it contains a BPA calculator sub-
block for each of the monitored metrics. Each sub-block 
contains two independent buffers: the anomaly-based buffer 
and the misuse-based buffer. The algorithm has an initial phase, 
where it gathers a number of incoming frames to fill the 
anomaly-based buffer. The anomaly-based buffer contains the 
metric’s values that define the behaviour of network traffic 
without classified attacks and it is implemented as a FIFO 
queue of prefixed size. In contrast, the signatures in the misuse-
based buffers are taken from previous attacks and are not 
dynamically updated. Specifically, to construct the misuse-
based buffer at a prior stage, only attack traffic is passed as 
input to our BPA calculator, described below, which generates 
the actual attack signatures relating to each considered metric. 
The metric BPA calculator block calculates the BPA value 
for the hypothesis of Attack (m(A)) and Normal (m(N)) by using 
the samples contained in both buffers. In more detail, the 
samples in both buffers are ordered in a low to high order, the 
percentiles (rather than quartiles as used in [21]) are calculated, 
and then the percentile within which the incoming metric’s 
value falls into is equated to the BPA value. The BPA for the 
hypothesis Uncertainty (m(U)) is calculated as a correction 
factor using the methodology presented in [21]. 
During the course of the detection process, if the BPA values 
computed inside the metric BPA calculator matches the exact 
same BPA values computed on the misuse-based buffer for all 
the hypothesis (as seen in the “Equal?” condition in Fig.1), the 
metric value is discarded from being added to the anomaly-
based buffer. The final decision of updating the anomaly-based 
buffer or discarding the metric value is taken on the basis of the 
result of a Boolean expression, which is true when the BPA 
value for the hypothesis normal (m(N)) is strictly greater than 
the BPA values of the other two remaining hypotheses. If the 
m(N) for the incoming analysed metric value is the largest BPA 
of the three, then the metric value is included in the anomaly-
based buffer and the FIFO queue is updated. The aim of this 
approach is to allow the anomaly-based buffers to dynamically 
adapt themselves to new operational conditions of the network 
and to improve the overall detector performance. The misuse-
based part of the algorithm is used as feed-back loop into the 
hybrid detection algorithm. 
2) Data Fusion Block 
The second block, the data fusion block, merges the BPA 
values for each metric and calculates the overall BPA value for 
each hypothesis by using the DS rule of combination presented 
in Section III.A. The DS technique fuses the outcome of block 
1, which was produced while considering anomaly-based and 
signature-based information, making the proposed detector a 
hybrid approach. Since DS can only merge two set of beliefs at 
a time, the data fusion block implements an iterative method 
when more than two metrics are considered. 
3) Decision-Making Block 
Finally, the third block, named decision-making block, is the 
one that makes the decision according to the outcome values of 
the BPA values. The hypothesis with the highest BPA value is 
considered the correct decision. 
IV. EXPERIMENTAL FRAMEWORK 
A. Virtual Jamming Attack Description 
One example of a virtual jamming is the NAV attack. This is 
the attack that we have used in our experiments for this work. 
The NAV attack exploits the virtual carrier-sensing mechanism, 
a mechanism proposed in the IEEE 802.11 standard which aims 
to mitigate the collisions resulting from the hidden-terminal 
problem. Specifically, the header of each IEEE 802.11 packet 
contains a particular field, named duration, which determines in 
milliseconds the time needed to transmit the packet on the 
channel and the time interval during which the channel will be 
busy. 
 
Figure 1. Architecture of the proposed hybrid NIDS.  
As part of the Carrier Sense Multiple Access with Collision 
Avoidance (CSMA/CA), every node in the wireless network 
reads the value of the duration field in order to set its own NAV 
timer. Assuming that the channel is busy and other node has 
something to transmit, the rest of nodes in the network will wait 
a period equal to NAV before start transmitting. After setting 
their NAV timer, the nodes start decreasing their back-off time. 
When the back-off timer reaches zero, if the channel is idle, 
then the nodes start transmitting; otherwise, they defer their 
 
transmission again. The overall CDMA/CA procedure is 
depicted in Fig. 2. 
To carry out a NAV attack, the attacker overwrites two 
mechanisms of the IEEE 802.11 protocol: the RTS/CTS 
mechanism and the procedure to calculate the back-off time. 
Within the RTS/CTS mechanism, the field duration of each 
RTS packet is set by the attacker to the maximum NAV value 
32767 (i.e. 32ms). Consequently, all nodes listening to the 
wireless channel will set their NAV timers to the maximum 
value and wait for the maximum time-interval to get access to 
the channel. On the other hand, the contention window of the 
back-off calculation mechanism is set to zero so that the 
attacker transmits in the very first idle time slot. Because the 
attacker is the first node to occupy the transmission channel, 
this attack makes all the wireless devices in the network to 
postpone any transmission.  
 
Figure 2. Representation of the virtual carrier-sensing mechanism. 
B. IEEE 802.11 Network Testbed Description 
The performance of the proposed H-NIDS has been 
evaluated on an experimental IEEE 802.11 network testbed, 
which was set up in our laboratory at the Wolfson School at 
Loughborough University. With this testbed, depicted in Fig. 3, 
we wanted to reproduce a realistic Wi-Fi scenario. The network 
testbed is composed of one AP and four nodes with different 
roles: Attacker, Monitor and two Clients. 
The Attacker (or jammer) runs on Linux Ubuntu 10.04 Lucid 
Lynx. The wireless Network Interface Controller (NIC) is 
equipped with the Atheros 5100 chip, which is controlled by the 
ATH 5K driver. As explained in the previous subsection, this 
driver has been modified, to ignore the timeout imposed by the 
RTS/CTS mechanism and by fixing a static value for the 
collision window defined by the back-off mechanism. More 
specifically, the Atheros 5K has been modified to incorporate 
two changes in the desc.c and base.c files. The modifications, 
maximise the NAV value (i.e. set ‘txctl2 |= 
AR5K_4W_TX_DESC_CTL2_RTS_DURATION') and 
disable the contention window (i.e. CWMIN and CWMAX are 
set to zero in the “ath5k_txq_setup()” function) as defined in 
the desc.c and base.c files, respectively. The driver is loaded as 
a new module in the kernel, forcing automatic binding with the 
hardware during the system initialisation. 
The Monitor node also uses a NIC equipped with the Atheros 
5100 chip. The NIC is configured in Monitor Mode to listen to 
the wireless channel. We used Wireshark [32] to collect the 
network traffic and our modified version of the ATH5000 
driver to gather live statistics regarding the Cyclic Redundancy 
Check (CRC) error rate from the wireless interface card. 
Lastly, we have used two Client nodes during our 
experiments, namely Client_A and Client_B. The clients follow 
the indications of the IEEE 802.11 standard, implementing the 
virtual carrier-sensing mechanism. Both clients send traffic 
during the whole monitoring period, and act as victims of the 
virtual jamming attack. The traffic generated by these nodes is 
artificially generated by using the Linux command iPerf [33] to 
send UDP and TCP traffic at a constant bit rate.. 
 
Figure 3. IEEE 802.11 Network Testbed Architecture. 
The experimental campaign is summarised in Table I. In 
order to validate our solution, a list of 14 scenarios is proposed, 
including both nodes located in a static position throughout the 
entire traffic capturing phase, and mobile nodes constantly in 
movement. The first two scenarios (1 and 2 in Table I) are 
normal scenarios where the attacker is inactive. Only non-
malicious network traffic is collected from these two scenarios. 
All the remaining scenarios (i.e. from 3 to 14) have a total 
duration of 90 seconds. Each scenario comprises three phases 
of the same duration: (i) initial phase, where only the well-
behaved nodes send traffic, (ii) attack phase, where the attacker 
node initiates the virtual jamming attack, and (iii) final phase, 
where the attacker stops the attack. 
TABLE I.  EXPERIMENTAL SCENARIOS  
Scenario Description RTS/CTS 
1 No attacker, fixed ClientA and ClientB - 
2 No attacker, fixed ClientA and fiexed 
ClientB (with high NAV value) 
- 
3 Fixed ClientA - 
4 Fixed ClientA and ClientB - 
5 Moving ClientA - 
6 Moving ClientA and ClientB - 
7 Fixed ClientA and moving ClientB - 
8 Moving ClientA and fixed ClientB - 
9 Scenario 1 with RTS/CTS enabled ClientA 
10 Scenario 2 with RTS/CTS for single host ClientB 
11 Scenario 4 with RTS/CTS enabled Both 
12 Scenario 4 with RTS/CTS for single host ClientB 
13 Scenario 7 sending TCP traffic ClientA 
14 Fixed ClientB sending TCP traffic ClientA 
The test cases are designed to replicate realistic scenarios of 
 
movement activity in Wi-Fi networks. The clients are setup by 
following two main configurations; Firstly, in the fixed 
scenarios, Client_A is placed 1 meter away from the AP when 
acting as static or fixed node, while, secondly, Client_B is 
placed 5 meters away. Fixed nodes maintain a constant distance 
from the AP throughout each scenario for the purpose of 
keeping stable parameter values in the received radio signal. 
Random movements are also introduced in moving nodes’ path 
to inflict signal variations, which has a direct impact on the bit 
rate. The movement reproduces a normal walking pace within 
an indoor environment, keeping a distance between 1 and 10 
meters from the AP. Additionally, the combination of both 
fixed and moving nodes provides a more realistic assessment of 
the proposed detection algorithm when multiple clients are 
competing for the available radio resources, while being 
affected by the virtual jamming attack. 
The devices in all these scenarios used UDP traffic. Only in 
scenario 14 were the effects of the virtual jamming attack on 
network traffic over TCP evaluated, which includes the 
establishment of a TCP session through the three-way 
handshake process. 
C. Metrics Description 
Multiple metrics were extracted from the network frames that 
compose the analysed datasets. The monitored metrics are: the 
NAV value, the inter-arrival time between consecutive frames 
(ΔΤ), the Frame Sequence Number (FSN) and the CRC errors. 
As we have explained in Section IV.A, an attacker can 
modify the NAV value in the network frames to carry out a 
virtual jamming attack. Therefore, it is a sensible decision to 
use the NAV as part of the detection process. Monitoring the 
NAV value to detect a greedy behaviour or NAV attacks is 
common in the literature [7, 9, 12]. However, detecting 
intelligent jamming attacks by simply monitoring the NAV is 
not a robust solution because legitimate frames may carry high 
NAV values [34]. The ΔΤ is also monitored because this metric 
is generally affected during the virtual jamming attack. The 
main effect of a jamming attack is a service disruption, causing 
bandwidth reduction. In turn, the ΔΤ would increase during a 
jamming attack. Therefore, a virtual jamming attack may also 
manifest itself in an increase of the ΔΤ values. We have also 
taken into consideration the FSN metric, which has detectable 
peaks in the first order time differences of the frame sequence 
numbers, ΔFSN. The FSN metric presents these differences 
because the Wi-Fi card buffers overflow during the attack and 
it causes some network frames to be dropped. In [9] and [10], 
the authors describe that an increase in the number of damaged 
packets is observable during a virtual jamming attack. Both 
papers point out that in collision attacks, the number of CRC 
errors raises. This phenomenon is observable in our scenarios 
soon after the attack in launched. In fact, since the attacker sets 
its contention window to zero, it forcefully takes over the 
channel causing many collisions. Because of this reason, we 
have also added the CRC to the monitored metrics. 
V. EXPERIMENTAL RESULTS 
A. Performance Metrics 
This section describes the detection results generated by the 
presented H-NIDS. The performance of the proposed solution 
has been evaluated using four well-known parameters, True 
Positive (TP), which represents malicious frames correctly 
classified as attacks; True Negative (TN), which represents 
normal frames correctly classified as non-malicious; False 
Positive (FP), which represents non-malicious frames 
misclassified as attacks; and False Negative (FN), which 
represents malicious frames misclassified as normal. These 
parameters are essential to calculate the following performance 
metrics, which provide quantifiable evidence of how effective 
the IDSs are at making correct detections.: 
• Detection Rate (DR): Proportion of malicious frames 
correctly classified as attacks among all the malicious 
frames. DR (%) = TP/(FN+TP)×100 
• False Positive Rate (FPR): Proportion of normal frames 
misclassified as malicious among all the frames. 
FPR (%) = FP/(TP+ TN)×100 
• False Negative Rate (FNR): Proportion of malicious frames 
misclassified as normal among all the malicious frames. 
FNR (%) = FN/(FN+TP)×100 
• Overall Success Rate (OSR): Proportion of all the frames 
correctly classified. 
OSR (%) = (TN+TP)/(TP+FP+TN+FN)×100 
• Precision: Proportion of malicious frames correctly 
classified as attacks among all the alarms generated. 
Precision (%) = TP/(TP+FP)×100 
• F-Measure: Also known as F-Score and represents the 
weighted harmonic mean of Precision and DR. 
F-Score = (2×Precision×DR)/(Precision + DR) 
B. Performance Analysis Under Normal Traffic 
 The H-NIDS has been initially evaluated in scenarios 1 and 
2, when no attack takes place, to evaluate the performance of 
the proposed H-NIDS in terms of FPR. In scenario 1, both 
ClientA and ClientB transmit using a low NAV value. In 
scenario 2, ClientA also transmits using a low NAV value, 
whereas ClientB transmits using a high NAV value. 
The experimental results for these two scenarios are reported 
in Table II, which shows the FPR results generated by each 
possible metric combination. The results show that the best 
single metric in terms of FPR for both scenarios is the NAV. 
Although the FPR for the NAV is around 2% in scenario 1, it 
exceeds 18% in scenario 2. Such drop in the performance is 
because in scenario 2, one of the legitimate users has set a high 
NAV value, which misleads the detection algorithm to produce 
a high number of FPs. In fact, the frames with the high NAV 
value are 17% of the total frames in the scenario 2 and all of 
them have been detected as malicious frames. 
Regarding the multiple metric combinations, a noteworthy 
general improvement with FPRs in comparison to the results 
previously presented in [17] is made possible by the hybrid 
nature of the proposed NIDS. 
 
The FPRs for all multi-metric combinations are below 15%, 
and all FPR results except for (ΔΤ, ΔFSN), (ΔΤ, CRC) and (ΔΤ, 
ΔFSN, CRC) are below 10%. In detail, we can observe 
improvement in the FPRs as more metrics are combined. For 
instance, in scenario 2, the FPR generated by the metrics 
combination (ΔΤ, ΔFSN) is nearly 10%, whereas the FPR for 
the single metric ΔΤ exceeds 86% and the FPR for the ΔFSN is 
nearly 38%. Regarding the metric combination (ΔΤ, CRC), the 
FPR is 14.5%, while the FPR for the single metrics ΔΤ and CRC 
are 86.5% and 99.9%, respectively. In some other cases such as 
the metrics combinations (ΔΤ, NAV ) and (ΔFSN, NAV), the 
FPR goes down to 10%. FPR of 14.5%, is obtained for the three 
metric combination of (ΔΤ, ΔFSN, CRC). However, for all 
other 3 metric combinations, FPR results are less than 5%. 
TABLE II.  FPR FOR SCENARIO 1 AND SCENARIO 2 
 
It is worth noting that the increase of the FPRs for the metrics 
combination including NAV is significantly smaller than the 
FPR results obtained with the single metric NAV in the scenario 
2. Finally, we notice a clear improvement of the FPR of the 
metric combination compared to the FPR presented in [17]. 
Taking into account the multiple metric combinations which are 
common in both papers, we notice a reduction in FPRs for the 
metric combination of (ΔT, ΔFSN), reducing from 25% in [17] 
to 10.3%. Similarly, the FPR for (ΔT, NAV) is reduced from 
86% in [17] to 1.72% (considering the worst case in scenario 
2), and finally the FPR for (ΔT, ΔFSN, NAV) is reduced from 
25% in [17] to 3.31%. 
C. Performance Analysis Under Attack Traffic 
 Table III shows the performance evaluation in terms of DR, 
FPR, FNR, OSR, Precision and F-Measure for the attack 
scenarios listed in Table I (Scenarios 3-14). The results 
presented in Table III have been obtained using a sliding 
window size of 50 samples, which represents the case when the 
best performance was observed. The set of data is made up of 
14 metric combinations and has been analysed for 12 scenarios. 
The results for the whole dataset are described by providing the 
median, the minimum and the maximum value of each 
evaluation parameter. In addition, the MAD (Mean Absolute 
Deviation) around the median is estimated, which is defined as 
;<= = >[|* − !ABCDE(*)|]. 
The results show that the proposed H-NIDS exhibits good 
performance for the single metric ΔT and NAV, as well as the 
metric combinations of (ΔT, NAV), (NAV, CRC) and (ΔFSN, 
NAV, CRC). In general, the hybrid solution produces a general 
performance improvement for the metric combinations when 
their performance is compared against the single metrics that 
are part of these combinations. 
The single metric ΔT produces generally high DR results 
(81%), even though with a relatively high MAD value (14.5%). 
The minimum value of DR 0% shows that the metric could 
completely fail to detect the attack in some cases; this also 
accounts for the observed high MAD value. The FPR is about 
59.9%, with a high MAD value. The FNR shows fair results as 
well; the median is 19% with a high MAD value of 14.5%. In 
general, the metric ΔT provides fair results, as indicated by the 
OSR, Precision and F-Measure, which range between low and 
high MAD values; 8.7%, 10.1% and 14.9% respectively. This 
low performance is caused because the legitimate clients are 
prevented from sending frames over the wireless medium 
during the attack and, consequently, the monitoring system 
cannot update the metrics for the calculation of the respective 
beliefs with enough frequency to strengthen the statistics of 
normal behaviour and allow detection of the attack instances. 
The single metric ΔFSN provides a low DR (57.2%) with 
high FNR and FPR (42.8% and 40.7%), all of them 
characterised by a high MAD value. Although the OSR is quite 
high, the Precision is very low and characterised by a high 
MAD value. The ΔFSN metric, as explained above for the 
metric ΔT, is not frequently updated by the monitoring system 
during the attack. Fig. 4 shows the ΔFSN over time for Scenario 
6. The majority of the normal instances (in blue) do not exceed 
100 ΔFSN. However, around second 1 and second 70, there is 
a cluster of normal instances that deviate from the majority of 
normal data, which generates a large number of FPs. The red 
part of the graph represents the ΔFSN values of the attacker. 
 
Figure 4. ΔFSN measurements in Scenario 6. 
The single metric NAV provides excellent results with a 
perfect DR and low FNR and FPR. In every scenario, the DR is 
100% (see also the MAD value, which is equal to zero). The 
FPR is about 4%, the minimum value for the FPR is about 0% 
Metrics Scenario 1 Scenario 2 FPR (%) FPR (%) 
1 
ΔT 86.5 86.5 
ΔFSN 25.2 37.8 
NAV 2.3 18.5 
CRC 99.9 99.9 
2 
ΔT, ΔFSN 10.3 10.3 
ΔT, NAV 0.02 1.72 
ΔT, CRC 14.5 14.5 
ΔFSN, NAV 0 0 
ΔFSN, CRC 4.72 4.72 
NAV, CRC 4.72 4.95 
3 
ΔT, ΔFSN, NAV 1.94 3.31 
ΔT, ΔFSN, CRC 14.5 14.5 
 
and the worst FPR is about 34%. The MAD value for the FPR 
is very low (2.8%). The FNR is zero in all scenarios. On average 
the single metric NAV provides high OSR and high Precision. 
Finally, the single metric CRC provides 100% DR, but with 
high FPR (87.1%). The single metric CRC, along with the 
single metric ΔFSN, provide the worst results among all the 
metrics. Fig. 5 shows the normalised CRC metric over time for 
Scenario 8. The CRC metric is very volatile and does not 
necessarily show a clear distinction between normal and attack 
instances, which can compromise the accuracy of the detector 
when used in isolation. However, when used along other 
metrics, such as (ΔFSN, ΔT), the DR improves from 7.6% to 
24.5%. 
 
Figure 5. CRC errors measurements in Scenario 8. 
Regarding the results generated by the two metric 
combinations, the combination (ΔT, NAV) is characterised by 
a high DR (80.7%) and FNR (19.3%), and a FPR equal to 0%. 
The low values of the MAD for the DR, FPR and FNR show 
that the aforementioned results are valid for the whole dataset. 
This metric combination generates high OSR (96.5%) and 
shows a clear improvement of the FPR (from 59.9% to 0%) 
when compared to the single metric ΔT. The OSR is also 
improved, when compared to ΔΤ. 
The metric combination (ΔFSN, NAV) is characterised by 
fair DR (about 57.2%), FPR (about 0%) but high FNR (about 
43%). In overall, this metric combination provides good results, 
with high OSR (90.7%) and Precision (99.7%). However, the 
high FNR, drops the performance of F-Score to 46.8%. 
The metric combinations of (ΔT, ΔFSN), (ΔT, CRC), and 
(ΔFSN, CRC) provide all bad results. The DR and the FPR are 
quite low, but the FNR as well as the MAD values are high for 
these cases. 
Among all possible two metric combination, the set (NAV, 
CRC) is the one that provides the best results. The performance 
of this set of metrics is similarly good to the results generated 
by the single metric NAV. In detail, the DR is 100%, the FPR 
is lower than 5% and the FNR is zero. These results are 
observed in all the scenarios, as confirmed by very low value of 
MAD (close to 0%) for the DR, the FNR and the FPR. 
With reference to the performance of the single metric NAV 
shown in Table II, the metrics combination (NAV, CRC) has a 
very low FPR (4.7%). This is especially evident in the scenario 
2, where the NAV is high not because of an attack is taking 
place but due to a legitimately high NAV value generated by a 
TABLE III. EXPERIMENTAL RESULTS 
%	
























Median	 81.0	 57.2	 100	 100	 7.6	 80.7	 21.2	 57.2	 29.6	 100.0	 38.7	 24.5	 70.8	
MAD	 14.5	 25.3	 0	 0	 7.6	 14.8	 17.4	 25.2	 17.6	 0.0	 34.3	 13.7	 10.6	
Min	 0	 6.2	 100	 100	 0.0	 0.0	 2.9	 6.2	 2.3	 99.6	 0.0	 3.6	 43.6	
Max	 100	 86.9	 100	 100	 37.2	 100.0	 71.5	 86.9	 59.8	 100.0	 86.9	 63.0	 87.2	
FP
R	
Median	 59.9	 40.7	 3.8	 87.1	 2.3	 0.0	 6.9	 0.0	 11.3	 4.7	 0.2	 7.1	 7.2	
MAD	 11.3	 7.9	 2.8	 5.1	 2.3	 0.0	 6.2	 0.0	 7.5	 3.7	 0.2	 6.9	 4.8	
Min	 0	 13.5	 0.1	 73.3	 0.0	 0.0	 0.1	 0.0	 0.6	 0.2	 0.0	 0.1	 0.5	
Max	 81.5	 59.6	 34.7	 96.2	 34.5	 0.0	 18.0	 34.5	 40.9	 13.5	 34.5	 40.9	 40.9	
FN
R	
Median	 19.0	 42.8	 0	 0	 92.4	 19.3	 78.8	 42.8	 70.4	 0.0	 61.3	 75.5	 29.2	
MAD	 14.5	 25.3	 0	 0	 7.6	 14.8	 17.4	 25.2	 17.6	 0.0	 34.3	 13.7	 10.6	
Min	 0	 13.1	 0	 0	 62.8	 0.0	 28.5	 13.1	 40.2	 0.0	 13.1	 37.0	 12.8	
Max	 100	 93.8	 0	 0	 100.0	 100.0	 97.1	 93.8	 97.7	 0.4	 100.0	 96.4	 56.4	
OS
R	
Median	 36.7	 52.1	 96.2	 12.9	 84.6	 96.5	 83.4	 90.7	 76.7	 95.3	 88.7	 81.6	 89.6	
MAD	 8.7	 8.1	 2.8	 5.1	 7.0	 2.5	 7.8	 4.9	 9.8	 3.7	 1.8	 7.5	 3.8	
Min	 18.5	 37.1	 65.3	 3.8	 54.0	 73.4	 64.5	 62.3	 47.9	 86.5	 62.3	 47.9	 55.9	




Median	 11.8	 15.8	 68.7	 12.9	 15.4	 100.0	 34.6	 99.7	 20.1	 77.3	 70.9	 30.6	 51.5	
MAD	 10.1	 9.7	 16.0	 5.1	 13.3	 0.0	 17.6	 0.3	 11.9	 18.9	 29.1	 15.7	 21.5	
Min	 0	 0.6	 20.8	 3.8	 0.0	 0.0	 4.2	 30.4	 4.1	 30.1	 0.0	 14.8	 25.9	




e	 Median	 20.7	 24.6	 81.5	 22.8	 8.0	 89.3	 24.4	 46.8	 23.9	 87.2	 41.1	 21.8	 56.0	
MAD	 14.9	 11.9	 11.6	 7.6	 8.0	 8.4	 15.4	 9.7	 9.2	 12.1	 23.9	 7.7	 10.7	
Min	 0	 1.1	 34.4	 7.3	 0.0	 0.0	 3.5	 11.6	 3.9	 46.3	 0.0	 7.0	 38.5	
Max	 40.9	 43.8	 99.8	 42.1	 33.3	 100.0	 59.0	 93.0	 53.5	 99.5	 93.0	 53.5	 87.5	
 
 
user. Therefore, the metric combination (NAV, CRC) not only 
provides excellent results, but also solves the problem related 
to the high FPR when the NAV is high for legitimate users. The 
very good results provided by (NAV, CRC) are confirmed also 
by the values of OSR, Precision and F-Score. 
Regarding all the three metric combinations, the best results are 
provided by (ΔFSN, NAV, CRC), which produce high DR and 
low FPR. The MAD value shows that the achieved FPRs are 
generally low and that the high FNR on average makes the 
solution a fair solution. The fair performance of this metric 
combination is also confirmed by the high OSR. 
VI. CONCLUSIONS 
In this work, we have tackled the problem of identifying 
virtual jamming attacks on IEEE 802.11 networks. We 
proposed novel hybrid NIDS based on DS theory able to 
efficiently detect NAV attacks. This novel detector, which 
extends the method that we previously proposed in [17], takes 
advantage of the two types of IDSs. The high DR performance  
generally generated by signature-based NIDSs along with the 
ability to detect novel attacks provided by the anomaly-based 
NIDSs. The detection process involves the combination of 
beliefs from different metrics across multiple layers of 
observation in order to produce a collective decision on whether 
a NAV attack takes place or not. The beliefs are combined with 
the DS theory of evidence. 
In order to evaluate the proposed solution, the hybrid NIDS 
has been tested on a real wireless scenario. A list of 14 different 
scenarios was proposed to emulate realistic scenarios in Wi-Fi 
networks. These scenarios include cases in which a client is 
located in a fixed position, keeping a constant distance to the 
AP, cases in which random movement is introduced to emulate 
an actual mobile behaviour, and mixed scenarios including both 
fixed and moving nodes to assess the performance of the 
detection algorithm within the same room when multiple clients 
are competing for the available wireless channel. The devices 
in all these scenarios used UDP traffic. Lastly, a test using TCP 
traffic was also carried out to study the effect of jamming attack 
on the establishment of a TCP connection. 
The performance results of the proposed hybrid NIDS has 
been evaluated using six well-known parameters. These are 
DR, FPR, FNR, OSR, Precision and F-Score. We have evaluate 
the performance results generated when different metrics 
combination are used, as well as single metrics. Among all the 
single metrics, the solution that exhibits the best results is NAV, 
which generates 100% DR, 3.8% of FPR and 0% FNR. As for 
the different metrics combination, the set (ΔT, NAV), (NAV, 
CRC) and (ΔFSN, NAV, CRC) generate performance results as 
good as the single metric NAV. These metrics combination 
generate good results for several of the tested real Wi-Fi 
scenarios. Overall, the results evidenced by the hybrid NIDS 
outperforms the detection results generated by the anomaly-
based NIDS presented in [17]. 
As for future work, we will focus our work on the 
development of a real-time hybrid NIDS able to detect a wider 
range of threats and cyber-attacks against wireless networks. 
Similarly, we will extend the implementation of the proposed 
hybrid NIDS to other wireless communication technologies, 
such as LTE and WiMAX. In addition, we wish to add the 
capability of automatic selection of relevant metrics tailored to 
specific types of attacks. 
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